191 13 E. 1, STAT. 1, CAP
or contained in the Fine to be
executed. (6) In like man-
ner an Ordinary shall be
commanded in his case, ob-
serving nevertheless as before
is said of a Mean, which by
Recognizance or Judgment is
bound to acquit.
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45, SCIRE FACIAS.
contentam exequi faciat. Eo-
dem modo mandetur ordinario
m sue casu observato nichilo-
minus quod supradictum est
de medio qui per recognition-
em aut judicium obligatus est
ad acquietandum.
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Fleta 2 c. 13, p. 76, sec. &. Co. Litt. 131 a. 2 Inst. 469. Bro. Debt, 10.
Bro. Parl. 29. Fitz. Scire fac' 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, &c. Fitz. Execut. 18, 35, 57, 96,
100. Cro. El. 164. There shall be no Delays in those things that be re-
corded. Execution of things recorded. A Scire facias after the Year.
Ordinary. A Mean. 13 Ed. 1, Stat. 1, c. 9.1
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1 At common law.—At common law a plaintiff who had recovered a
judgment in a personal action could neither sue out execution nor revive
the judgment by scire facias after a year and a day from its rendition,
but was obliged to bring an original action in which he could offer the
judgment as evidence of the debt. The rule was different in real actions
because, the judgment therein being for land, an action of debt would
not lie, and therefore in order to give plaintiff the benefit of his judgment
it was held that a scire facias would lie for the land. To remedy this and
make the procedure more uniform in both actions, the above Statute gave
plaintiff the right to revive a judgment in a personal action by scire facias
if he had neglected to issue an execution within the year. After that
time the law presumed the judgment satisfied or released and the defend-
ant was not to be disturbed without an opportunity of pleading his re-
lease, or showing some other reason why the execution should not issue.
Mitchell v. Chestnut, 31 Md. 521; Hagerstown Bank v. Thomas, 35 Md.
511; Johnson v. Lemmon, 37 Md. 336; Browne v. Chavez, 181 U. S. 68.
Nature of scire facias.—Although a scire facias to revive a judgment
is generally termed a judicial writ and although it is as against the judg-
ment debtor and his heirs and personal representatives a continuation of
a former proceeding, still it is really an action, since the defendant has
a right to plead to it any defense which goes to show that his liability
has been discharged or extinguished. Browne v. Chavez, 181 U. S. 68;
Kirkland v. Krebs, 34 Md. 93; Brooks v. Preston, 106 Md. 693.
The writ is in the nature of a declaration and should contain on its face
such a statement of facts as to justify the process as to the form in which
it is issued and the persons who are to be made parties to it. It should
also contain such proper recitals as to show in what right and for what
amount it is issued; and this with sufficient certainty to enable the court
to give judgment. McKnew v. Duvall, 45 Md. 501; Bish v. Williar, 59 Md.
382; Bowie v. Neal, 41 Md. 124.
It is not an original writ and can therefore be made returnable only
on the return day of the regular term. Bridges v. Adams, 32 Md. 577. The
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