SALMON v. CLAGETT-—3 BLAND. 121

ant Edmund Clagett, retained the possession of all the deceased's
real and personal estate, using and employing it for the common

Rev. Code, Art. 65, sec. 77. But in White v. Davidson. 3 Md. 169, it is said
that the issuing of an injunction does not necessarily require a bond, for
that is a matter resting in the discretion of the Judge who is to order it.
See post, "Practice."

VI. INJUNCTIONS AGAINST JUDGMENTS AND EXECUTIONS. Equity will not
relieve against a recovery at law, unless the justice of the verdict can be
impeached by facts or on grounds, of which the party seeking the aid of
Chancery could not have availed himself at law, or was prevented from
doing it by fraud, or accident, or the act of the opposite party, unmixed
with any negligence or fault oil his own part. Gott v. Carr, 6 G & J. 309.
and in addition to the cases there cited, see Sasscer v. Young. 6 G. & J. 343:
Miller v. DuvalI, 26 Md. 47.

A party is bound to be present in Court, in person or by attorney, to take
care of his rights, and cannot make the omission to perform this duty, the
foundation of itself, of an injunction. If a defendant has the means of
defence within his power, or if, by the exercise of due diligence he could
have ascertained the same, and neglects to do so, and suffers a recovery to
be had against him, he is precluded from obtaining relief in Chancery in
relation to the same matter. Ibid, A defence which has been fully tried
at law cannot be set up in equity, although it may be the opinion of equity
that the defence ought to have prevailed. Briesch v. McCauley, 7 Gill, 190.
The mere fact of the discovery of evidence since the recovery ai law is not
per se a sufficient ground tor an application to equity for relief; but there
must be conscience, good faith, and due diligence shown, as a condition
upon which such application will be entertained. Gorsuch v. Thomas. 57
Md. 339. But where a party is not in fault by failing to use reasonable dili-
gence, and is prevented from defending the action at law by fraud or acci-
dent, or the acts of the opposite party, equity will lend its aid and give re-
lief. Wagner v. Shank. 59 Md. 313.

The fact that the defendant's attorney in a certain case, did not know of
the existence of a former judgment recovered by the plaintiff, after process
duly served on an officer of the defendant, i a corporation, i on an alleged
identical cause of action before a Justice of the Peace, would not. of itself,
entitle the defendant in the judgment rendered by the J. P. to an injunc-
tion to restrain the execution of such judgment, on the ground of fraud
and surprise. Darling v. Balto. 51 Md. 1. If the second suit above men-
tioned was for the same cause of action as that on which the judgment was
rendered by the justice, that fact ought to have been availed of by a plea of
former recovery. Ibid

G. applied for an injunction to restrain execution on the ground that he
had paid the amount of the account filed at the extension of the judgment,
before the suit was brought, and that T., the plaintiff in the judgment, sub-
sequently agreed that he should have credit for that amount on the judg-
ment; but that no such credit was given. He also alleged that the two
credits entered on the judgment were erroneous, as being for amounts less
than were actually paid, and that there would be but a small amount, if
anything at all, due on the judgment, if proper credits were given. He did
not, however, state the amount of the credits or when the payments were
made. It was not alleged that the judgment was obtained by fraud, or by
such surprise and mistake of T. that by the use of due diligence and proper