SALMON v. CLAGETT.—3 BLAND. 127

11. Clagett, John W. Clagett and Thomas Ciagett, of the one part,
and Charles Salmon of the other part. " Whereas, the said Thomas
Clagett, one of the parties of the first part of this deed, hath
lately commenced and intends pursuing the business of a merchant
in the City of Baltimore; and whereas, the said Charles
* Salmon hath agreed to give credit to, and to become surety 127

against the judgment. Key v. Knott, 9 G. & J. 342. In Groff v. Hansel, 33
Md. 161, it was held that fraud in obtaining a promissory note, &c., or a
failure of consideration, may be relied on at law as a defence to an action
on the note. And see Gent v. Ensor. 41 Md. 24. [But it would seem that
the jurisdiction of equity in cases of fraud like the above is not lost, because
Courts of law have subsequently acquired a like authority. Originally
fraud was not admissible as a defence in actions ex contractu to enforce
covenant, debt. &c. The jurisdiction of equity still exists. Whether it will
be exercised or not. depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.
As a general rule, it will not be exercised if the legal remedy of the de-
frauded party, either affirmative or defensive, is adequate, certain and com-
plete. Pomeroy Eq. Jur. sees. 278. 911, 914.] When the bill to restrain
execution distinctly charges that persors other than the defendant partici-
pated in the alleged fraud, they are necessary parties defendant. Hill v.
Reifsnider, 59 Md. 429.

An execution upon a supersedeas enjoined, because the date of the con-
fession omitted. Dilley v. Shipley, 4 Gill. 48. Where a judgment debtor
paid plaintiff a part of his debt and proposed to pay the balance by the con-
veyance of a lot in which he had no interest in consideration of a release to
be granted him. and then seeks to have execution of the judgment enjoined,
it is asking the Court to compel the creditor to exonerate him without con-
sideration. Gurley v. Hiteshue, 5 Gill, 217. As to restraining execution, for
the purpose of enforcing an equitable set-off against the judgment, see post.
sec. VII.

Though the Court of Chancery has not the power to review a decree of the
Court of Appeals, either upon the facts upon which that Court acted or any
others, yet when a state of facts has arisen since such decree was passed,
showing its satisfaction. Chancery may interfere by injunction to prevent
the decree from being used as an instrument of injustice, and an original
bill is the proper form to be adopted under such circumstances. McClellan
v. Crook, 4 Md. Ch. 398. Vide 8. C. 7 Gill, 333.

An injunction against a judgment stays execution thereof, but the lien of
the judgment is not lost or suspended. Anderson v. Tydings, 8 Md. 438.
As to suspension of the judgment by appeal from order dissolving the in-
junction, see Smith v. Dorsey, 6 H. & J. 261.

When the sheriff, or other officer, is prevented by injunction from selling
personal property taken in execution, he shall deliver back such property to
the party from whom it was taken, and shall not be answerable to the plain-
tiff at law for the same. Rev. Code, Art. 65, sec. 78. But if the execution
was consummated by a sale prior to the injunction, then the sheriff should
not pay the money over to the defendant at law. Dail v. Traverse. 8 Gill,
41. But the rule is different in a case where real estate has been seized and
the execution enjoined. After the dissolution of the injunction which had
prevented a sale of the land, the proper mode is for the sheriff to proceed to
sell under the original levy, which remains unbroken; or to have him com-
manded to make a sale of it by a venditioni exponas. Cape Sable Co's Case,