| Volume 200, Volume 2, Page 128 View pdf image (33K) |
 |
|
|
 |
|
|
128 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY. WILLIAM HERTLE AND MARY ANN HIS WIFE vs. McDONALD,EX'R. AND AUGUS- TUS SCHWARTZE. MARCH TERM, 1850. [PRACTICE—STATUTE OF FRAUDS——TRUST—LIMITATIONS—DISABILITY—LAPSE OF TIME.] PAHOI, proof cannot be offered, to change or contradict the terms of a deed or contract, in writing, upon the ground of fraud, surprise or mistake, unless ap- propriate allegations are contained in the bill. It is indispensable that a trust, founded on the agreement of the parties, should be manifested and proved by some writing, signed by the party creating it. The trust need not he created, but must be proved, by writing. Mortgagees in possession, and holding without an acknowledgment or recog- nition of the title of the mortgagor, for twenty years or more, would not be liable to be redeemed, though there is no statutory bar to the right of re- demption. For the sake of uniformity between the proceedings in courts of law and equity, twenty years after forfeiture and possession taken by the mortgagee, no in- terest having been paid in the meantime, has been fixed upon as the period, beyond which the right of redemption does not extend. As courts of equity have adopted the period of twenty years as a bar to the right of redemption, in imitation of the first clause of the statute, so they have also adopted the ten years, fixed in the proviso, for prosecuting after the disability is removed. Successive or cumulative disabilities are not allowed to interfere with the run- ning of the statute, and where the only disability at the time when the right of action accrued, was infancy, it was held, that the ten years must be com- puted from the termination of infancy, though the party may have married before her infancy terminated. In this case, the right of action accrued in 1813, and the bill was not filed un- til 1845, thirty-two years after the right accrued, and fourteen after disabil- ity removed; it was HELD, that the statute of limitation was an insuperable bar to the relief sought by the bill. Lapse of time is a defence peculiar to courts of equity, who discountenance stale and antiquated demands, for the peace of society, by refusing to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights. [This case originated in the equity side of Baltimore County Court, and was removed to the Court of Chancery under the act of assembly. The facts upon which the relief prayed is refused are fully set forth in the Chancellor's opinion.] |
| |||
|
| ||||
|
| ||||
Please view image to verify text. To report an error, please contact us.
Reports of Cases in the High Court of Chancery of Maryland 1846-1854
| Volume 200, Volume 2, Page 128 View pdf image (33K) |
|
Tell Us What You Think About the Maryland State Archives Website!
|
An Archives of Maryland electronic publication.
For information contact
mdlegal@mdarchives.state.md.us.
Maryland State Archives