220 CAMPBELL'S CASE.

The solicitors of the parties, on the 25th of July, 1829, filed an
agreement in the following words: 'It is agreed, that this cause
shall remain in its present state until September term; and unless
some other agreement shall be entered into before that time, that
such decree shall then be entered as may appear agreeable to the
course of the court, upon the case made by the bill and answer now
filed.' No other agreement having been entered into, the case was
submitted, with a consent by the solicitors of the parties, except
the defendant McHenry, that a decree, as proposed, should be
passed.

31st October, 1829.—BLAND, Chancellor.—The agreement under
which this case has been submitted, is conclusive upon all the adult
parties to the suit, except the defendant John McHenry, who is
not a party to it; but he, being in default for not answering, may on
the proceedings and proofs, be considered as having waived all
objections to the plaintiff's obtaining the relief asked by the bill.

In regard to the lunatic and the infant defendants, it is clear,
that their interests cannot be bound by any special agreement;
and, therefore, although a committee or guardian ad litem, of a
lunatic or infant may, in a regular course of proceeding, in some
cases, consent to a decree; (g) yet as to them, in this instance, the
court must found its decree upon other and better ground than that
of a peculiar agreement by which adult and sane persons alone are
competent to bind themselves.

According to the general course of the court, all cases must be
regularly set down for hearing before either party is allowed to call
for a decree. But in creditors' suits the course is somewhat dif-
ferent. In such cases, to prevent delay, and as so much is to be
done after the funds have been brought into court, and every thing
may be so easily set right, by further directions, it has long been
the established practice here, as well as in England, in all such
cases, where the whole, or a part of the plaintiff's claim, as desig-
nated in the bill, has been distinctly established or admitted, as
specified; and it is shewn or confessed, that the personal estate has
been exhausted, or is insufficient, at once to pass a decree, direct-
ing the real estate to be sold, without waiting for the case to be
fully prepared for a final close, or to be regularly set down for hear-
ing, (h) And this being a creditor's suit, a decree for a sale may,

(g) Hammond v. Hammond, post.

(h) Holme v. Stanley, 8 Ves. 1.—Lloyd v. Johnes, 9 Ves. 65.—Birch v, Glover,
4 Mad. 376.