CAMPBELL'S CASE. 223

tors; or be prevented from being taken and applied in satisfaction
of his debts; yet in most cases, where a creditor of a lunatic

One of the heirs, a defendant, answered and said, that he admitted the note, but

believed 'that the said Johnson was not solely the security; but that both him and
the father of this defendant were both jointly indebted in the sum for which the
said note was given.'

After which the plaintiff by his petition, without oath, prayed that he might be
permitted to proceed against the defendant who had appeared as the heir at common
law of the deceased, and by an order of publication against his other heirs, under the
act of 1797, ch. 114.

15th June, 1807.—J. T. CHASE, Chief Judge.—The object of the bill in this case
is to compel the defendants, &c. &c. It is stated by the plaintiff, being the Chan-
cellor of the State and interested in the suit, to the chief judge of the third judicial
district, that John H. Brown, one of the defendants, who is the eldest son of John
Brown, deceased, therein mentioned, and would have been his sole heir if the act
to direct descents had not taken place, has appeared to the said bill and his appear-
ance having been entered on the docket—it is thereupon Ordered, that the plaintiff
cause a copy of this order to be inserted at least three weeks successively in the
Maryland Gazette before the twentieth day of July next, to the end that each of the
heirs of the said John Brown, who are defendants, may have notice of the said bill,
and of its substance and object, and may be warned to appear in the Chancery Court
on or before the thirtieth day of November next, in person or by solicitor, to shew
cause, if any they have, wherefore a decree should not pass as prayed.

On the 10th of February, 1809, the plaintiff William Kilty, the then Chancellor,
in his notes addressed to the chief judge, says: 'The papers in this case are sent to
the chief judge of the third judicial district, on the supposition that they are ready
for a decree. It was the practice of the late Chancellor, on bills for the sale of
real estates, to decree, without having the case set down for hearing, whenever a
sufficient ground appeared in the proceedings. In this suit, a petition was filed in
June, 1807, under the act of 1797, ch. 114; and an order thereon, which is certified
to have been duly published. The object of this bill is, that the suit may be carried
on between the complainant and the defendant who appeared, and that there should
be the same decree as if the heirs had appeared, and against them the bill may be
either taken pro confesso, or a commission may be directed. According to the
practice, as above mentioned, the office-copies of judgments have been considered
sufficient, if not contested by the answer; and the whole of the claims exhibited
have not been required to be proved as stated before a decree; but they have been laid
before the auditor with further proof, together with any other claims. This much
is intended to apply to that part of the answer which states, that R. Johnson was
not a mere surety, but was equally indebted with John Brown. But there is suffi-
cient evidence of the other claim and of the personal estate being deficient.

20th February, 1809.—J. T. CHASE, Chief Judge.—The bill in this case, which
according to the act of 1805, ch. 65, s. 19, was addressed to the chief judge of the
third judicial district, being ready for decision, and the claims of the suing
creditor, and the insufficiency of the personal estate being sufficiently established;
and the publication having been duly made, after the appearance of John H. Brown,
who would have been the sole heir of John Brown, deceased, if the act to direct
descents had not taken place, against the other heirs,—

It is thereupon Decreed, that the bill as to the said other heirs be taken pro
confesso; and that the real estate of John Brown, deceased, not heretofore sold, or