CAMPBELL'S CASE. 829

which they dispose of their estates, are laws which they are allowed
to make, and which are not to be altered even by the king in bis
courts of law or conscience. (6)

It has been held in England, that a private act of parliament
which had been obtained by fraudulent suggestions, or by a sup-
pression of the truth, might, on that ground alone, be relieved
against by any court of law or equity in which the fraud could be
fully and clearly shewn. As was done in a case in the High
Court of Chancery of England, before our revolution, in which an
act of the legislature of the then province of Pennsylvania was,
about the year 1725, set aside on the ground of its having been
obtained by fraudulent suggestions, (c) And so too, in some other
cases, where private acts had been passed by the parliament of
England, upon false suggestions, they were, upon that ground
alone, vacated by the Court of Chancery on a bill filed by the
party grieved. (d)

It seems to be generally admitted, in England, that the rehearsal
or recital of general and public facts and circumstances in a statute
cannot be denied; such as the rehearsal in the statute de donis of
what was the common law before the passing of that act, (e) or the
recital in a statute, that great outrages had been committed in a
certain part of the country; and that therefore the statute was

(6) Gary v. Bertie, 2 Vern. 337; Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. 731; Kendall, Ex
parte, 17 Ves. 525; Sumner v. Powell, 2 Meriv. 30.

(c) Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. 454; 5 Cruise Dig. tit. 33, 5, 50—Francis Fane,
counsel to the board of trade, in his opinion given to that board, on the 3d of March,,
1725, respecting an act passed by the General Assembly of Jamaica to foreclose a
mortgage, says: 'I think, in general, that such laws would be greatly dangerous,
and that the legislature should rarely interfere in matters of private right, without the
greatest necessity; but, I cannot see any great inconvenience in this ease, but rather
a necessity indeed, for passing the law,' &c. After which he proceeds further to
say, that 'Mr. West, in his report upon this matter, is of opinion, that all facts alleged
in the colony bills must be taken to be true. This rule may, generally, be true; but
I think, in adversary bills of this nature, which are only the party's own state of the
case, this rule should not be extended further than the particular facts mentioned;
but, I apprehend, it ought not to presumed, that every thing is fully stated, and
that all facts and circumstances are disclosed, that are necessity to give a perfect
insight into the merits of the bill; for though the facts alleged may be true, yet other
facts may be sunk, which may alter the case, and defeat the allegations of the bill;
neither do I think it safe to argue from the analogy and reason of penal laws in the
plantations, to a bill of this kind; Because rules of state policy are no proper
measure to adjust private property.' 2 Chalmer's Opin. Em. Lawyers, 8, 10, 41;
Partridge v. Dorsey, 3 H. & J. 807, note; Owings v. Speed, 5 What. 420.

(d) 5 Cruise Dig. tit 33, s. 51, 53; 2 Blac. Com. 346.-(e) Co. Litt, 19,
30 v.2