further notes that there is no express authority for the Division of
Correction to hold an individual pending execution of the death sentence.
The absence of such express authority gives rise to a number of issues,
including: (1) whether the sheriff or the Division of Correction has legal
custody of the individual after the individual is delivered to the Division of
Correction; and (2) whether the Division of Correction has authority to
hold an individual in custody after the expiration of a warrant of execution
or during the stay of a warrant of execution. To address these issues, the
Committee believes that subsection (a) of this section should be amended
to require that a court, after sentencing an individual to death, commit the
individual to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction pending
execution of the death sentence. See, e.g., § 9-103(a) of this article (which
provides that, in noncapital cases, individuals are sentenced to the
jurisdiction of the Division of Correction and committed to the custody of
the Commissioner of Correction), The Committee also believes that
subsection (b) of this section, which establishes duties of the sheriff while
an individual is in custody of the sheriff, should be repealed as obsolete.

Also in subsection (a) of this section, the former reference to the "city" in
which an individual is indicted is deleted as unnecessary because the
defined term "county" includes Baltimore City. See § 1-101 of this article
for the definition of "county".

In subsection (b) of this section, the references to the defined term
"inmate" are substituted for the former references to a "felon" and "convict"
for consistency throughout this article. See § 1-101 of this article for the
definition of "inmate".

In subsection (b)(1)(ii) of this section, the reference to an inmate who is "in
the custody of the Division" is substituted for the former reference to "said
felon ... in the penitentiary" for consistency with § 9-103(a)(3) of this
article, which provides that any reference to the confinement of an inmate
in a particular State correctional facility must be construed to mean
confinement in the Division of Correction.

The Correctional Services Article Review Committee notes, for
consideration by the General Assembly, that the meaning of, subsection
(b)(2) of this section is unclear. The part of former Art. 27, § 74 that is
revised in subsection (b)(2) of this section required a sheriff to keep an
inmate in solitary confinement "as hereinafter provided when said felon is
in the penitentiary". However, there were no provisions in the Death
Penalty subheading of former Art. 27 (i.e., §§ 71 through 79) that required
an inmate to be kept in solitary confinement while in the penitentiary.
Therefore, subsection (b)(2) of this section does not appear to impose any
duty on the sheriff. If the General Assembly does not repeal subsection (b)
of this section for the reasons discussed above in this Revisor's Note, the
General Assembly may wish to repeal subsection (b)(2) of this section as
meaningless.

In subsection (c) of this section, the reference to an inmate "under sentence