Now, by looking at the 3d section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the United States, gentlemen would see that it was declared that "new States may be admitted by Congress into this Union: but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State." That was to say, for example, that the Eastern Shore could not he erected into a new State within the jurisdiction of the State of Maryland.

Mr. HICKS interposed and said, that he had forgotten in the remarks which he submitted to the Convention, to call its attention to an order which he had introduced some weeks ago, and which was referred to Committee No. 14, in relation to the grant of this power in the bill of rights. It was not to form a new State, but to unite the Eastern Shore to the States of Virginia or Delaware, upon such terms as might be mu. tually agreed upon.

Mr. STEWART, of Caroline, resumed. To unite the Eastern Shore to the State of Delaware was just as much the creation of a new State, as the admission of Texas was the admission of a new State: because the word "State," as he understood it, referred not so much to the territory as to the government. The people and the government, taken together—laws, property, &c.,—all these things constituted a State. So, if the Eastern Shore were united to Delaware, such a union would be just as much the creation of a new State as if Delaware and the Eastern Shore were now a territory, and should be received into the Union as a new State.

But he would not be diverted from the purpose for which he had risen, which was to show that we already possessed the right asserted in the amendment; for the latter clause of the same section of the Constitution of the United States, which he had already cited, went on to say, "nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of Congress."

If Delaware and the Eastern Shore agreed that the Eastern Shore should become a part of Delaware, and made application to Congress and Congress gave its consent, and if a like consent should also be given by the Legislatures of the two States, then the union might take place.

But where was the licensed high priest to marry the Eastern Shore to Delaware or Virginia? He had heard of the union of individuals brought about by money, where it was considered that a most beneficial arrangement had been effected. But here we proposed to offer ourselves as a virgin arrayed in matrimonial garments—with what recommendation? Why, the recommendation of an enormous debt. He was afraid that our charms would be disregarded; and he did not wish that any portion of the State should put herself in such a position. It seemed to him that it would be well to amend the proposition of the gentleman from Dorchester, (Mr. Hicks,) by adding the words "provided we can get any State to accept of us." There must be a mutual bargain, and it might happen that the State to which the Eastern Shore desired to unite herself would not accept her.

But he thought it was too late to ask that the Eastern should secede from the Western Shore. He alluded to the dark clouds which had overshadowed the horizon of Maryland, as having passed away, and being followed by the promise of calmer skies and brighter hopes.

He characterized, as a strange doctrine, the principle which had been asserted here, that it was necessary to engraft upon the Constitution a provision specifying the mode in which the organic law should be changed. He held that the people were just as sovereign, and, he might say, as divine over their government, as the Great Ruler of the Universe, was over His. They were sovereign—supreme—uncontroled.

As to the argument that Government was a compact, he regarded it as just such a compact as a man might make with himself. He might resolve and re-resolve; he might form his own government, and change it as he thought proper. So it was with the people. He cared not whether the provision was in or out of the Constitution, if the people said they would change their government, they could do so—they would do so—and they ought to do so. He proceeded to examine and illustrate the consequences to which a contrary doctrine would lead, and to argue that its result would be a Constitution so framed as to stand through all changes and though all time, without regard to the wants or the wishes of the people. Such was not his doctrine, or the doctrine of the people of Maryland.

He should, therefore, vote against the amendment of the gentleman from Dorchester (Mr. Hicks,) not because he, (Mr. S.) had any objection to doing this act, if it were deemed proper and right, but because he thought that the power already existed under the Constitution of the United States. As to the proposition of the gentleman from Baltimore city, [Mr. Presstman,] he [Mr. S.] could see no objection to it. It was a principle to which all must subscribe. He was not in the habit of citing authorities, and would not now trouble the Convention with them; but he thought that gentlemen would find, that in the Constitutions of almost every State in the Union, the same principle was contained, and not only so, but that the framers of the Constitutions of Virginia and other States, had gone so far as to declare that a majority of the people had a right to alter and change their Government, in any way they might think proper.

Mr. JENIFER said, he did not rise to controvert the principle involved in the proposed amendment of the gentleman from Baltimore city, (Mr. Presstman.) He did not believe there was an intelligent man in the community, who would deny that the proposition, in the abstract, and standing alone, was the true republican doctrine. But it had been embarrassed, and its meaning perverted by the arguments of gentlemen, and especially by the speech of the mover of it. The amendment assumed the right of the people to alter, change or abolish their Constitution. The gentleman from Baltimore goes a step further, and desires it to be recognized in the bill