

this: We stand here to do the best we can. We stand here to deal with the Government as a high contracting party. We stand here to make a bargain. Would any man consult so little the interest of any other man for whom he had to act, as to give up everything or surrender his property, and then trust to receiving compensation when none has been promised or agreed upon? Do men pay, *after* they get what they want, when they will not pay in order to secure it? If the Federal Government is so poor that it cannot pay for the slaves now, and if the Government will say, "Now give up this property on trust, and we will pay hereafter," that would be fair. There would be a *pledge*, an *obligation*, and the contract could be carried out hereafter by payment of compensation, or could be enforced. There would be something to hold the Government bound by. Upon these terms I would rely upon the plighted faith of the Government. But the gentleman proposes to do a *wrong* to his people, to take away their property without compensation, and then trust to *merely trying* to get it at some future day. In these days of uncertainty, when no man knows what the future will bring forth, I think the gentleman trusts to a broken reed. If he fails, will he have carried out in good faith his pledges?

Adopt this proposition, and I believe Congress will not adjourn without making the appropriation. It will continue in session until it makes this appropriation to the State rather than have emancipation fail. Congress would make an appropriation of twenty, aye, of fifty millions of dollars, if they believed that the State of Maryland had made compensation the condition of emancipation, as we are bound in duty to the people of the State to do, if we discharge fully our obligations. Congress would not adjourn, after the adoption of the proposition I offered, until the appropriation was made. Of course, if the Convention emancipates without *conditions*, it releases the Government from all obligation to pay, and the State assumes all the liability resulting from emancipation. The General Government never will step in, and pay *ex mero motu*, for what the State says she will not ask it to pay for, and which the State does freely and voluntarily, from motives of public policy and to advance her welfare. The gentleman from Howard pursues a strange course to secure the compensation to which he is pledged. He ad-

vocates emancipation for reasons of State policy, and seeks to effect it in the exact manner which will release the General Government from all obligation or liability to the State or its citizens.

And this, Mr. President, brings me to the question of the constitutional power of Congress under all the facts of the case, to make this appropriation to the State of Maryland.

I maintain, sir, that not only has the State of Maryland a *right* to make compensation by the General Government a *condition* of emancipation, but the General Government has the constitutional power to make such an appropriation to the State, and not only the constitutional power, but is under a constitutional duty and a *moral* obligation to pay to the State of Maryland, in case she liberates her slaves, a sum which will enable her to compensate her citizens, based upon the number of slaves in the State under the census of 1860.

Without admitting the power of the General Government to make appropriations to carry out a general scheme of emancipation in all the States—and I shall show that my proposition does not involve the maintenance of the affirmative of this claim of power—I hold the government has the power to make such an appropriation to the State of Maryland. Slaves, I have already shown, are recognized as property by all branches of the systems of government under which we live, both State and Federal. Slavery in Maryland has not been destroyed by the war. Those in rebellion have carried off no slaves worthy to be taken into consideration in this argument. They have not escaped to the Southern States, and there been sheltered and protected by the enemies of the government. The real value of slave labor in Maryland has not been lessened. On the contrary it is worth *more*, has more real *value* now than before the breaking out of the war, in consequence of its scarcity and the high price of agricultural products. While its worth has been diminished, not by the actual depreciation of the value of negro labor, it results from the *insecurity* of the *tenure* of that property, caused not by State action—not by the action of a foreign power—but by the *direct* action of the Federal Government. This destruction of the value of slave property in Maryland has been produced, firstly, by abolishing slavery in the District of Colum-