ties and all forms of the spirit of innovation. As an essential appendage to their new social organization, the first Colonists of Maryland brought with them—votaries as they were of well regulated freedom—a Chancellor. And from that period the Court of Chancery has abided among us, active and salutary;ministering for our dearest rights, and our resource for the care of all the best interests which connect us with society, or seek the protection of our political franchise. Whether such an institution so proved and so diffusively useful, shall be abated, is a very serious question—and the reasons may well be called for, why it should fall, rather than those why it should continue to exist. The constant employment of the Chancellor in his judicial business, argues strongly for the idea that the court is not practically regarded as a superfluity. And shows at least that local convenience and considerations are not enough to commend other co-ordinate jurisdictions to extent of the large equity business which is constantly flowing into the Court of Chancery, and engrosses the time of that Court. At no period, if we may take the business of the Court as an illustration—has the court been more in favor with suitors and more useful. Much business has doubtless been attracted to it at all times from the peculiar assiduousness of the present Chancellor and other Chancellors who from time to time may have officiated—but that valuable quality could not alone and without strong inherent merits in the institution itself have filled the dockets of the court. The particulars collected by the committee from the Court of Chancery,and from the sixth judicial district (of Baltimore and Harford) confirm this position. It is, however, easy to verify it by a few and obvious considerations of the peculiar appropriateness of this court for the equity business. The emergencies in which a court of equity has to afford prompt and comprehensive relief, and the many occasions for judicial action in the progress of even the simplest chancery suit make it necessary that the equity judge should be always accessible at some fixed point and at the seat of his court,and constantly in a situation to attend to equity business. In that respect a suit in equity differs from a suit at law. The latter requires seldom if ever any action of the judge in the intervals between the stated terms of the court, hence the importance, and, for certain and