232 CAMPBELL'S CASE.

accountable for their conduct, (p) These are our fundamental
axioms and first principles; Consequently, the general assem-
bly, or all, or any portion of our government cannot exercise sove-
reign authority, in any case, over any subject whatever; since it
is clear that, when regarded in this point of view, our whole
government must be considered as strictly limited, as well by its
general nature, as by the special provisions of the constitution
itself. Here, therefore, the sovereignty belongs altogether and
exclusively to the people of the state, (q)

It is declared, that the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct
from each other; (r) that no state shall pass any bill of attainder,
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; (s)
and that no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or dis-
seized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty,
or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land, (t) Consequently, the general assembly must be considered
as restrained, not only by the general principles and delegated
nature of the government itself, from exercising any arbitrary
power over the rights or property of an individual; but according
to this declared separation of powers, and under the positive
restrictions by which its powers are limited, it can exercise no
Hi authority which is manifestly beyond the confines of its own legi-
timate sphere as a legislative department, (u) It cannot adjudicate
upon any matter in the manner of a court of justice; (w) it can
make no partial distinctions among citizens, (x) or pass any law
impairing the obligation of contracts; nor can it be allowed to
assume the truth of any facts upon which of itself to pronounce a
judgment, or to direct the judiciary to do so in any manner, so as
onerously or destructively to affect the rights of any one; or, by
passing or repealing any law, to deprive any one of a previously
vested right of property, (y) And looking to the delegated and

(p) Decla. Rights Maryland, art. 1 and 4.—(q) Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,
2 Ball. 811; Calder v. Bull, 3 Ball. 886; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 John. Rep. 4T7;
Enslin v. Bowman, 6 Binney, 471; Trustees of the University v. Foy, 2 Haywood,
310, 374; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters, 880; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters,
^8; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. and J. 463.—(r) Decla. Rights Maryland, art. 6.—
(t) Const. U. S. art. 1, s. 10.—-(0 Decla. Rights Maryland, art. 21.—(u) Berrett
9. Oliver, 7 G, and J. 206.—(w) Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 John. Rep. 508; Evans v.
Hates, 3 Wheat. 513$ Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. and J. 476.—(x) Kames' Pri. Eq.
b. 2, c. 8; Decla. Rights Maryland, art 30,—(y) McMechen v. The Mayor of Bal-
timore, 2 H. and J 41.