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CAMPBELL'S CASE. 233

very limited nature of our government, as compared with that of
England, it may be confidently affirmed, that this court would be
acting entirely within the range of its unquestionable authority, in
going fully as far as the English tribunals have gone, in controlling
all legislative enactments, in relation to private property; by dis-
regarding the facts assumed in the enactment, when found to be
untrue; by setting such legislative enactments aside when obtained
by fraud; and by confining their operation, so as to prevent them
from impairing the obligation of contracts, or affecting the rights
of purchasers, or the interests of third persons who are strangers
to them. And in treating all special and private legislative enact-
ments as a sort of conveyances which can only be allowed to bind
those who are parties to them by having asked for or assented to
their passage, (z)

Where it appeared, that, in consequence of a misrepresentation
to the general assembly, the party had obtained that which he
could not have obtained on a fair and full statement of facts; that
he had not only concealed facts, which, if known, would have
defeated his purpose; but had suggested a matter which he knew
to be contrary to the truth. It was held by this court to be incon-
sistent with reason and justice to suppose, that, because the defen-
dant's patent was sanctioned by an act of the legislature, his title
must be clear and indefeasible; and that the court was precluded
from an examination of the circumstances alleged in the bill. That
the legislature, not being constituted for the investigation of facts,
relative to the rights of individuals, or of matters in controversy
between private persons, it never could be admitted, upon any
sound principle of justice, that any allegation or matter of fact
assumed in a legislative enactment should be considered as incon-
trovertible by any one not a party to it. For even if the legislature
should be deemed a tribunal competent to the examination of facts,
and that too from which there should be no appeal, it was certainly
an universal rule, that no man should be affected by a decision to
which he was neither party nor privy, (a) Nor is the truth of any fact
thus assumed in an act of one general assembly, considered as at
all conclusive upon their successors. As where it had been as-
serted, that the object contemplated by the act incorporating The
Potomac Company had been accomplished; (6) the truth of that

(z) Beall v. Harwood, 2 H. & J. 171; Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420; Cassell v,
Carroll, 11 Wheat. 149.—(a) The State v. Reed, 4 H. & McH. 10; Fisher v. Lane,
3 Wilson, 302; 1826, ch. 164.—(6) 1802, ch. 84.

(